Each concept is read twice: whether the approach carries it over, and whether the approach's own sources claim it. A concept that the approach claims but does not carry over is a shortfall. A concept that it neither claims nor carries over is an omission, which marks a gap in the field rather than a failure of the work.
Contestability
PartialShortfall · partially preservedDefinition (Philip Pettit, On the People's Terms, 2012)
This concept holds that anyone subject to a decision must have a real route to challenge it. They must be able to inspect the grounds for the decision, contest the outcome, and have the challenge answered. Legitimacy is not settled once by an election or an act of consent. It depends on that route remaining available. On this view, a political order is free when the people its decisions affect can contest them, whether or not its rulers are kind.
Analysis
The papers argue for Pettit's route. A reading of the specification should be open to challenge, and the challenge should be answered by someone other than whoever made the reading. On two of law's three interpretive stages, they go beyond argument. Ambiguity is reduced when the rule is written and constrained when it is applied, and both interventions measurably work. The third stage, which gives the regime of Contestatory constitutionalism its name, is left untouched. Nothing lets a person subject to a reading contest it, and a panel of reasonable interpreters is an evaluation instrument rather than a forum.
Non-domination
PartialShortfall · partially preservedDefinition (Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 1997)
This concept holds that freedom is not the absence of interference. A person is unfree if someone holds unchecked power over them, even if that person never misuses it and means well. A benevolent master still dominates, and so does an authority whose workings cannot be seen. Legitimacy requires power to be checked, and good intentions are not enough.
Analysis
The papers state the concern about domination in its strongest form. Whoever fixes the reading of an ambiguous principle holds unchecked power over everyone the principle governs, and at present nobody can see that reading being fixed. The interpretive constraints are a real check. Discretion is narrowed by a rule stated in advance rather than by the interpreter's restraint, which is exactly Pettit's structural move. However, the developer holds this check over the model. The governed do not hold it over the developer.
Public decision record
PartialShortfall · partially preservedDefinition (Common-law practice)
Rulings on challenges are written down, published, and citable. The legal order's interpretation of its own rules therefore accumulates in public, where it can be studied, invoked, and criticized. This record makes the legal order both predictable and legitimate, since nothing is settled in private and every decision leaves its reasoning on record.
Analysis
A record of readings is what the papers concretely ask for. The jurisprudence essay draws on Dworkin and Sunstein to argue that a line of construction has to accumulate in public. What is built instead points the other way. The rule-refinement pipeline removes ambiguity by rewriting the rule, so the disagreement is erased in the rule itself rather than recorded and cited. Nothing is written down that a later case could invoke.