Plural normative orders
PartialShortfall · partially preservedDefinition (John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 1986)
Different communities' norms are genuinely in force at the same time. Rather than one official rulebook with tolerated deviations, there are multiple active systems of rules side by side.
Analysis
The approach carries over the part of the concept that avoids collapse. ComPO conditions preference optimization on the community a judgment came from, rather than fitting one averaged reward. Modular Pluralism keeps a pool of separately trained community models instead of distilling them into one. Takahashi (2026) argues on epistemic grounds that distinct world models must not be merged. What is missing is Griffiths' requirement that each order be 'in force'. The orders here are statistical portraits that the developer curates and installs by training on data about a community, not rule systems that the community writes or administers. They also sit beneath a main model that answers by default and consults the modules. A community missing from the fixed list has no order at all. This is closer to one official rulebook with modeled variations than to plural living systems.